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Britain – contrary to received wisdom – was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, 
despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the 
last quarter of the century. 
War with Louis XIV from 1689 led to the end of all trade between Britain and 
France for a quarter of a century. The creation of powerful protected interests both at 
home and abroad (notably in the form of British merchants, and investors in Portuguese 
wine) led to the imposition of prohibitively high tariffs on French imports -- notably on 
wine and spirits -- when trade with France resumed in 1714. Protection of domestic 
interests from import competition allowed the state to raise domestic excises which 
provided increased government revenues despite almost no increases in the taxes on land 
and income in Britain. The state ensured compliance not simply through the threat of 
lower tariffs on foreign substitutes but also through the encouragement of a trend towards 
monopoly production in brewing and restricted retail sales of beer (which began around 
1700 and continued throughout the eighteenth century).  
This history is analyzed in terms of its effects on British fiscal and commercial policy 
from the early 1700s to the end of the nineteenth century. The result is a fuller, albeit 
revisionist account of the rise of the modern state that calls into question a variety of 
theses in economics and political science that draw on the naive view of a liberal Britain 
unilaterally moving to free trade in the nineteenth century. (JEL Classification: F13, H20, 
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Britain – contrary to received wisdom – was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, 
despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the last 
few decades of the 19
th century. Moreover, British tariffs tended to be reformed by first 
lowering or abolishing duties on items in which Britain had enjoyed a comparative advantage 
or which were usually not significant for their trade. The few tariffs that remained – 
particularly on items such as wine and spirits – were among the most protective of all tariffs 
and were mostly the same sorts of tariffs decried by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations. 
These in fact went back to the earliest period of British mercantilism in the 17
th century when 
war and politics totally distorted trade relations between Britain and France for the next two 
hundred years.  
Although later authors have tended to dismiss these high tariffs as being “merely” for 
revenue, their high level, the selective nature of the duties, the difficulty of separating out 
revenue from protection, and the seriousness with which British rivals such as France treated 
changes in these tariffs shows how misleading has been the simplistic story of free trade 
Britain that we have inherited. 
The argument is this: an English state eager to reduce its trade deficit with France in 
the late 17
th century found that opportunity as a result of the wars that ran from 1689-1713. 
War with Louis XIV’s France provided the excuse that protectionists had sought to cut off 
virtually all commerce with the French. This was especially important for the trade in wine 
and spirits, one of the largest components of the 17
th century English trade deficit. Prohibition 
and protection led to the creation of powerful interests at home and abroad (notably the 
brewing industry in London and the English-dominated wine industry in Portugal) who 
benefited from the absence of competing French imports. These groups successfully lobbied 
to impose new and nearly prohibitive tariffs on French goods – notably on wine and spirits – 
when trade with France resumed after the war. Protection of domestic interests in turn 
allowed the state to raise domestic excises in a credible fashion, therefore leading to a    2
dramatic increase in government revenues without a need to increase taxes on landed 
property. The state ensured compliance not simply through the threat of lower tariffs on 
foreign substitutes, but also through the encouragement of oligopoly in the production and 
sale of beer. Both entry into wholesale brewing and retail distribution were more tightly 
regulated and restricted throughout the 18
th century, making for a concentrated domestic 
interest that could work in concert with Parliament. 
The net result was an expansive British state with revenues collected through the 
newly created central tax administration and a cooperative brewing industry that found it easy 
to shift much of the burden of this taxation onto consumers, who had little say in the matter. 
The growth of British revenues in the 18
th century was so dramatic that it made possible 
Britain’s rise to prominence as a world power (Brewer 1988). 
In addition, the protective tariffs had long-term consequences for the pattern of British 
domestic consumption, perhaps even altering or at least shaping the fundamentals of British 
“taste.” Deforming the centuries’ old wine trade with France meant that wine was kept out of 
the British Isles during the century and a half which included the Industrial Revolution and 
the rise of mass consumption. It ensured that beer would be the dominant component of the 
ordinary Briton’s drinking habits, and it restricted the consumption of fine Bordeaux and Port 
to the upper classes. 
But this also had long-term effects on the structure of British tariffs. As early as 1789 
– thanks to the Eden Treaty – there were early attempts to reform the trade arrangements, but 
these were interrupted by the French Revolution. 
By the 19
th century, the leaders of the political class were increasingly favorable to 
liberal policy though there was still much political opposition to the notion of free trade. It is 
therefore striking that when the momentous series of reforms in Parliament leading to 
removal of the Corn Laws passed in the 1840s, reform of the tariff on wine, spirits, and 
related products were not changed at all
1. Yet these self-evidently protectionist tariffs 
antedated the Corn Laws that are often seen as the epitome of British mercantilism, and were 
even explicitly noted in Smith’s Wealth of Nations (Nye 2007). Nonetheless, lowering or 
reforming the tariffs on wine, rum, sugar, coffee, tea, etc. now threatened British revenues. It 
did so both directly through reduction of duties, but more indirectly through the likely need to 
pare domestic excises to avoid complaints from local producers of competing products that 
even the most ardent free traders did not see fit to challenge these duties after Britain has 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the sugar tariff was significant in this regard, because the conversion of sugar into 
alcohol was a significant component of the spirits industry.    3
supposedly moved to free trade in the 1840s. The net result was that Britain was not a truly 
free trade nation until very late in the 19
th century.  
The simplest way to appreciate the seriousness of the issue is by examining average 
tariffs for Britain and France in the 19
th century. This basic measure – the sum of duties 
divided by the value of all imports, is the most common approximation used to indicate the 
extent to which a nation is or is not a free trader. 
Figure 1 shows average tariff rates for Britain and France throughout the 19
th century. 
What is most surprising is that – contrary to conventional wisdom – British tariffs were 
higher than in France for most of that century. The two curves do not cross until the mid-
1870s, and the degree to which French tariffs were higher than in Britain in the last few 
decades of the 19
th century was not nearly as pronounced as the reverse comparison for the 
early 1800s. This is especially striking because conventional historical narrative has tended to 
treat Britain as having become a free trader after repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s, while 
France is said to have remained stubbornly opposed to free trade at least until the 1860s 
(Kindleberger 1964). 
Part of this was rhetorical: the British claimed to have moved to free trade, and the 
French nearly the reverse. But part of it has to do with the peculiar nature of British tariffs. 
For the most part they were concentrated in comestibles, beverages, and non-industrial goods 
such as liquor, coffee, tea, sugar, and wine. In contrast, the French had a larger number of 
tariffs and even had prohibitions on a number of items including some textiles and various 
manufactures, prior to the 1860s. 
But what was significant is that the British tariffs were so much more binding. They 
imposed very high rates on items that were a large component of consumption of foreign 
products. More importantly, these were items in which Britain did not have a comparative 
advantage. Hence the establishment of high and even prohibitive (sometimes reaching several 
hundred percent) duties on items that Britain did not specialize in producing corresponded to 
the classic Ricardian case of distortions from free trade. 
Many scholars have tended to view these tariffs as mere fiscal impositions that were 
in no way protective of domestic industry (e.g. Irwin 1993, Tena 2006). But these claims tend 
to limit considerations of trade distortions to the narrow policy of mere producer protection 
(as opposed to all distortions in both consumption and production introduced by duties). They 
also take us too far into questions of the intended purpose of duties as being relevant to the 
question of who was and was not a free trader. In the British case, this was especially 
inappropriate because many of the so-called revenue tariffs of the 19
th century were so clearly    4
put into place in an earlier period as part of protectionist policies targeted quite specifically at 
Britain’s rivals, notably the French. Moreover, the view that all the tariffs were offset by 
equivalent excises on domestic beverages has been shown to be false (Nye 1993). Above all, 
even a uniform excise on domestic and foreign beverages would have a protectionist effect to 
the extent that the taxes are imposed solely on the class of goods in which Britain did not 
have a comparative advantage.
2  
The tariffs on wine and spirits went back to the period 1689-1713 when England 
ceased all commerce with France as a result of the Nine Years’ War and the War of Spanish 
Succession. This cessation of trade was especially significant because France was England’s 
largest trading partner in the 17
th century and the largest source of imports. Stopping trade 
with France turned England’s large merchandise trade deficit into a surplus for several years. 
And a very large portion of Anglo-French trade – at least 20 percent – was wine. The 
cessation of imports from France led to a surge in imports from Spain and, more 
significantly, Portugal. As Portugal was not noted for its capacity to produce wine and spirits 
prior to this period, the heavy shift in production directed almost exclusively towards the 
English market was quite significant (Nye 2007). Portugal was an ally, even something of a 
dependency of England, and Englishmen dominated the Portuguese wine and spirits trade as 
growers, producers, merchants and shippers. When the fabled Methuen Treaty of 1704 was 
signed, England was granted the right to sell textiles freely to the Portuguese in exchange for 
a promise that Portuguese wine would enter England (and later Britain) at a duty level never 
to exceed two-thirds of duties imposed on other nations (Nye 2007). Since Portugal was not 
particularly successful at selling wine to other nations, this arrangement was a clear distortion 
aimed at creating a supplier of alcoholic beverages that would be favorable to England. 
Indeed, as Portugal had enjoyed only the most minimal success in exporting wine and spirits 
prior to the quarter century of war with the French, the Methuen Treaty virtually created the 
overseas wine market for Portugal. 
As has been detailed elsewhere, the end of war with France did not lead to free trade 
with France but rather a highly limited trade based on elevated volume tariffs that specifically 
were designed to exclude the bulk of French products from the British market. 
                                                 
2 Consider the difference between raising revenue by taxing all textiles versus taxing all alcohol. Both could 
have been designed not to favor local vs. imported products, but the choice of which class of goods to tax has 
implications for the trade balance. The only neutral tax would be a uniform excise on all goods and services. 
    5
Supplementary tariffs on items that passed through French ports, or were delivered by French 
ships, or duty reductions on colonial products increased the favoritism against France and in 
favor of British domestics and allies. Moreover, the fact that – alone among all the British 
tariffs – the wine and spirits duties were set by volume, rather than ad valorem, meant that 
cheaper products were entirely excluded from Britain, while small quantities of higher end 
alcohol, such as the best claret from Bordeaux, would continue to make their way to Albion 
(Nye 2007). 
This was also significant because the other group that benefited tremendously from 
protection were local brewers and distillers. Beer had emerged as the most important, mass-
produced beverage during the years of the Anglo-French wars at the end of the 17
th century. 
Technical improvements leading to economies of scale in brewing, coupled with the growth 
of London as the major British urban center, promoted beer as the common beverage and also 
encouraged the transformation of the industry from small-scale home production to 
concentrated large scale industry. This tendency was further enhanced by laws designed to 
limit entry into the brewing industry and to lessen concentration in the retail trade as well 
(Mathias 1959, Nye 2007). Thus, the brewing industry was well-placed to benefit from 
protection afforded by wine tariffs, but also to bargain directly with the government as a 
powerful special interest which could (and did) argue for continued protection throughout the 
18
th century. Attempts to invade the oligopoly tended to fail as late as the early 19
th century 
(Nye 2007). 
This also provided the state with a reliable means of imposing a credible tax on 
domestic consumption of beer and spirits. Whereas previous attempts (in the 17
th century) to 
raise the excise on beer only raised revenues by a modest amount (due to the varieties of 
evasion that were practiced), the 18
th century saw the successful imposition of a variety of 
excises that were effectively enforced and paid to the government. 
Figure 2 shows the steep rise in income earned by the British state throughout the 
eighteenth century, of which the largest share was due to earnings from customs and excises. 
Table 1 indicates that during 1788-92, some 40 percent of the major British taxes were due to 
alcoholic beverages or inputs to brewing and distilling. The striking feature is the stability of 
the share of revenues from property and land; it remained fairly constant throughout the 18
th 
century. At a time when Britain managed a dramatic increase in the size of state and built up 
its military to become the dominant power in world affairs, this shift in the relative source of 
the tax burden was quite remarkable. Moreover, there has been no rigorous analysis of why 
only Britain and none of the other major powers were able to accomplish this. North and    6
Weingast (1989) famously point to the role of the Glorious Revolution in making state 
borrowing and taxation more credible, but give no reasons why the government was able to 
collect more revenue. A focus on the struggle over wine tariffs and brewing excises makes 
clear that this shift in interest group politics led to a configuration of interests in which taxes 
could be imposed and credibly collected from the parties most likely to attempt evasion (Nye 
2007). 
This also meant that when the time came to reform the British tariff system in the 19
th 
century, the importance of the tariffs for revenue – not primarily for the direct revenue they 
generated but for their ability to collect revenue from producers of domestic substitutes – 
served as a drag on legislators’ capacity to implement reforms that substantially altered duties 
on these new luxuries. Indeed, even the repeal of the Corn Laws, which were a much later set 
of agricultural tariffs than the various duties on alcohol and luxuries, proved so politically 
difficult that the proponents of the legislation were forced out of power as a result in the 
1840s (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006). 
In addition, the way in which the tariffs were imposed drastically reshaped the 
consumption patterns of the British citizenry. Fixed volume duties had the effect of excluding 
all trade in the lowest quality wines and of tilting the import mix of the remaining products 
towards wine that was high in alcoholic content or to very high quality products. For the most 
part, the Portuguese wines benefited from the double effect of their higher alcoholic content 
and of course from the lower level of the duty itself. Spanish products did not have quite the 
same preference as that of wines from Portugal, but they still benefited from the shift towards 
more alcoholic products. For the most part, an overwhelming share of the market left to the 
French was at the very highest end. 
Detailed records of what types of wines were being imported and in what quantities 
are not available but, as Nye (2007) has demonstrated, one can infer the extent of the quality 
shift simply by examining the ratio of wines imported in the barrel versus those in the bottle. 
Given high transportation costs and the possibilities of breakage, only the best wines tended 
to be shipped directly in bottles. Hence, it was typical for the ratio (by volume) of barrel to 
bottled wines from France to reside in the range of 15 to 1 up to 25 to 1. In contrast, the ratio 
for Britain tended to be on the order of 3 gallons of barrel wine for every gallon imported in 
bottles (Nye 2007). Hence, the perception of wine as primarily being a luxury product in 
Britain had less to do with any essential qualities of the wine itself or any peculiarities of 
British culture. Rather, a policy designed to exclude cheap wine and promote beer shaped    7
what we think of as the canonical British penchant for beer, whiskey, gin and rum for the 
masses, and claret, sherry and port for the elites. 
 
 
A Digression on effective protection 
 
 
It is common to speak of protection as being the opposite of free trade. But this depends on 
how narrowly one defines protection. In theory, what one would like to do is to have a 
benchmark of pure free trade and observe how far a country deviates from that benchmark. 
The problem is that there has been no generally accepted measure that does this for the 
diverse mix of policies that countries have implemented to distort their trade. The beginnings 
of a theoretically rigorous basis for measuring trade distortions probably stem from the work 
of Anderson and Neary (1996) in which they propose a trade restrictiveness index (TRI) that 
is equivalent to whatever uniform tariff rate would produce the same economic welfare effect 
as the mix of actual tariffs, quotas and other trade restrictions in place.  
It has been commonplace in the applied trade policy literature to rely very heavily on 
measures of effective protection – that is, on the extent to which a given tariff protects the 
competing domestic industry taking into account taxes and restrictions on that industry’s 
inputs as well as outputs. This however, is a conceptual error. For one thing, it limits attention 
to only some of the many distortions introduced by tariffs. For example, a focus on effective 
protection tends to ignore the overall effect of tariffs on welfare when there are no clear 
domestic substitutes. And yet the baseline Ricardian case taught in every course in trade is 
one in which the importing and exporting nation each specializes in producing one 
importable and one exportable, so that any tariff would lead to distortions from the ideal 
benchmark. Thus, no “effective” protection, yet tariffs in both nations would clearly be 
distortionary deviations from the free trade ideal. Indeed, in this most basic case, a 
distortionary import tariff is identical to a revenue tariff on consumption of the importable. 
Nonetheless, a measure of effective protection at distorted prices would be zero in that 
instance, since there would be no domestic industry to protect. Indeed, in most cases, the 
presence of a protected domestic industry benefitting from tariffs would probably be 
indicative of a smaller overall distortion than the case where the domestic industry is only a 
weak substitute or is non-existent (since there is less surplus loss from limiting trade when 
local goods are closer equivalents to foreign imports). Most important of all is that there are    8
rarely tariffs which are purely for revenue or purely for protection. High tariffs for revenue 
induce the production and use of goods that are weak substitutes. Tariffs that are designed to 
be protective may nonetheless raise substantial sums for the treasury. 
This is especially relevant for the case of Britain and France in the mid-19
th century. 
One of the justifications for British tariffs is that many were merely revenue tariffs or, as in 
the case of wine versus beer, tariffs were offset by domestic excises. But as Nye (1993) notes, 
British excises were in fact far below the tariff levels on French wine, especially when taking 
into account the distortions that led to the lowest quality wine (the ones most likely to 
compete with beer) being totally excluded from the market in the first place by the high level 
of fixed, volumetric excises. 
More important, a more rigorous investigation of the effect of tariff distortions using a 
computable general equilibrium framework (that improves on Anderson and Neary 1996) 
makes possible a precise calculation of the extent of distortions introduced by tariffs in 
Britain versus France. The calculations demonstrate that the overall welfare distortions of 
British tariffs in the period prior to the 1860 Treaty were substantially greater than they were 
for France (see Dakhlia and Nye 2004, and also see the appendix in Nye 2007). The welfare 
losses as a percentage of GDP were approximately three times larger for British tariffs as 
they were for French trade barriers, based on a simulation where both countries eliminated all 
tariffs completely. 
Most important of all, we have already seen that the entire history of tariffs on 
imported alcohol was deeply protective by design, and that this protection was tied into the 
state’s capacity to extract revenue from the protected industry. 
Given the high levels of duties and regulations, it is also quite likely that the generally 
weak substitution effects between all imported beverages (including tea and coffee) and on 
items that were inputs into the production of spirits (such as sugar) were more important than 
one would expect from a cursory examination of direct substitutes. That we have done little 
to examine the equally complicated links between other production categories and the variety 
of duties and regulations surrounding imports and exports suggests that a superficial 
treatment of tariffs that seeks to disaggregate “good” from “bad” or liberal from illiberal 
duties is likely to mislead. 
The significance of the wine tariffs can be seen by comparing the ex post ad valorem 
rates of protection on wine (using total wine import duties divided by wine import value) 
with the excise on beer. Using average tariff rates on wines and comparing them to the ad 
valorem rates on domestic beer shows that the wine rates were several times higher than the    9
rates on beer until the 1860 Treaty of Commerce. For the rest of the century, the average 
wine tariffs were approximately two to three times the rate charged on beer (figure 3). 
However, even these differences understate the differences between the wine tariffs and the 
beer excises, because the wine tariffs were not imposed ad valorem. The tendency to levy 
them first by volume, and then (after 1860) by alcoholic content would mean that the 
cheapest and lowest alcoholic beverages would be most highly discriminated against. Those 
drinks of course would have been the ones most likely to be competitive with beer even 
though the 1860 reform partially redressed the discrimination between French wine and 
Portuguese products. But domestic beer remained somewhat protected from foreign 
competition throughout the 19
th century. In addition, high tariffs on weak substitute 
beverages such as coffee or tea also added a layer of protection. 
Most important of all, the mere fact of high taxes on the entire class of beverages, 
both non-alcoholic and alcoholic, would have distorted British production and consumption 








It is only after the passage of the 1860 Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce that Britain and 
France began to conform to the more common narrative about British free trade. In particular, 
the removal of French prohibitions on British goods in exchange for a lowered tariff on 
French wine leads to steadily lower average British tariffs so that, by the late 1870s, British 
tariffs are clearly below those of France. 
Some of the theories that derived from the conventional view of unilateral British free 
trade policy need to be reconsidered in the light of this revised history. For example, a classic 
claim by Kindleberger (1964) is that free trade was a public good and that individual nations 
had incentives to free ride on other free traders by raising tariffs strategically. Depending on 
the game being played, this might not have been economically rational (if a nation has no 
market power in world trade, any tariff is sub-optimal), but there may have been political 
reasons for nations to engage in strategic tariffs even if it were economically rational to stick 
to unilateral free trade. As a consequence, Kindleberger hypothesized that what is needed is a 
free trade leader that benefits differentially from open trade and that is willing to hold fast to    10
free trade in the midst of free riding by minor powers. This thesis has been elaborated in the 
political science literature under the heading of hegemonic stability (see also Gilpin 1987 and 
Keohane 1984).  
If we do not start from the assumption that Britain uniquely and unilaterally moved to 
free trade, the theory of hegemonic stability is discredited. Instead, we see that bilateral 
agreements stemming from negotiations between the leading trading powers played the 
pivotal role in promoting Europe-wide freer trade. Thus, even someone who insists that 
Britain was the sole free trader prior to the 1860 Treaty of Commerce would be hard pressed 
to show that this led to a copycat effect. There was no movement to free trade self-evidently 
triggered by British moves. Parallel or similar moves in France and the Zollverein states 
either preceded or were independent of the British changes. 
The really important and critical event was the signing of the 1860 Anglo-French 
Treaty of Commerce. Of great significance was the use of Most Favored Nation clauses in the 
trade treaty that allowed Britain and France to expand the sphere of open trade by concluding 
equivalent agreements with other European powers. Anxious not to be left out of the trading 
bloc resulting from the two leading powers in Europe ending centuries of trade war, virtually 
all of Europe was quickly drawn into the fold. The result was the period of perhaps the freest 
intra-European trade ever seen before or since (Nye 2007, Pahre 1998). 
This also changes the conventional narrative about British influence on European 
trade. If the new view is taken into account, not only was Britain not the unilateral free trader, 
but British exhortations to move to freer trade did little to change the pattern of European 
commerce. If anything, it was the bilateral agreement with France that was the strategic 
lynchpin of European liberalization. Since bilateral agreements were viewed then and now as 
undesirable compromises away from a purist liberalization strategy, it is ironic that the 1860 
and the subsequent treaties signed throughout Europe were the proximate cause of the 
continental expansion of commerce in the late 1800s.  
If Britain did not succeed in igniting free trade by repealing the Corn Laws at the 
beginning of the 19
th century, did she at least preserve free trade by her principled adherence 
to low tariffs at the end of the century?  As we will see, British exceptionalism did not allow 
Britain to serve as a successful free trade hegemon, and most leading nations moved to 
partially protectionist policies by the end of the 1800s. 
The period of political enthusiasm for nearly free trade following the 1860 Treaty was 
to be short-lived, at least in its purest form. Within a decade of the Anglo-French agreement, 
changes in the world market for primary goods, particularly in agriculture, led to reversals in    11
policy such that the core supporters of the European agreements – notably France and 
Germany – reinstating targeted protective tariffs.  
The crucial factor seems to have been the increasing importance of grain from both 
Russia and the New World in raising supply and lowering world prices, partially as a result of 
openness, but primarily resulting from the drastic lowering of transportation and transactions 
costs throughout the 19
th century. Land rents fell, and incomes to the owners of agricultural 
land declined relative to labor wages (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007, pp. 396-97). Thus, the 
Germans implemented both agricultural and industrial tariffs in 1879 in an alliance that – in 
principle – turned back on the liberal principles of the 1860s and 1870s. The French began to 
return to agricultural and industrial tariffs as agricultural imports grew. 
The most damaging argument against the Kindleberger thesis of a free trade hegemon 
is that British adherence to genuinely liberal trade policy at the end of the century does not 
seem to have prevented the major European powers from abandoning earlier agreements.  
However, there might be some merit in the leadership argument, at least if one wanted 
to weaken the case to claim that British free trade served to moderate the protectionist 
upsurge that was seen in the late 1800s. It is worth noting that these changes, drastic as they 
were, still kept overall average tariff levels in the last decades of the 19
th century below their 
levels in the decades immediately following the end of the Napoleonic wars. 
For example, German average tariffs from 1880-1913 were 8.6 percent below the 
average rate of 10.4 percent for the period from 1834-65, and only slightly above the 8.4 
percent average rate for the period from 1834-1913 (Dedinger 2006). In France, average 
tariffs for 1880-1900 were around 7.9 percent compared with 12.5 percent for 1840-60.
3  
Whether the abandonment of free trade, in principle, and its replacement by an only 
moderately protectionist regime was partly due to a British influence, or was completely 
dependent on domestic considerations, is an issue that scholars will have to take up in future 
work. What is clear is that any consideration of the role of British leadership in the promotion 
of freer trade in this period needs to be reconsidered, and a fuller account must be given of 
the interplay between domestic and foreign policy considerations. Furthermore, it is clear that 
an economically robust treatment of agricultural distortions will have to take fiscal 
considerations into account where there is a strong tax-collecting reason for import tariffs. 
                                                 
3 Averages calculated from Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985). Tena (2006) has advanced arguments that 
would indicate that tariff averages for France should be much higher than the official statistics suggest, 
especially for the periods before 1860 and after 1880, but only as a result of his excluding items that were “fiscal 
products.” I have argued (Nye 1991 and 1993) that such exclusion is arbitrary, and it inappropriately conflates 
the intent of tariffs with their overall effects. In any case, the symmetry of the adjustments make clear that, even 
in this extreme case, one should not see the late 19
th century as unusually protectionist in France.    12
This is almost certainly the case for nations where excises and customs are of comparable or 
greater importance for revenue than income and property taxes, as was the case in Britain 
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Table 1: Major taxes, Britain, 1788 to 1792 
 
Tax item  Tax revenue  Type of tax Share of total 
taxes (percent) 
 (£’000)  
1 Direct taxes   
Land, windows, etc.  3388 Direct 21.2 
   
2 Food   
Tea 583 Customs 3.6  
Salt 999 Customs 6.3  
Sugar 425 Excise 2.7  
 subtotal 12.6 
3 Heat, Light, Fuel  969 Cust & Exc 6.1 
   
4 Construction 
material 
648 Cust & Exc 4.1 
   
5 Clothing, footwear  1010 Cust & Exc 6.3 
   
6 Soap and Starch  501 Excise 3.1 
   
7 Alcohol and tobacco   
Beer 1968 Excise 12.3  
Malt 1838 Excise 11.5  
Hops 121 Excise 0.8  
Wine 739 Customs 4.6  
Foreign Spirits  990 Customs 6.2  
Domestic Spirits  654 Excise 4.1  
Tobacco 607 Customs 3.8  
 subtotal 43.3 
8 Commercial Services   
Newspapers, etc.  533 Stamp 3.3 
   
Overall total  £15,973 100.0 
 
Source: O'Brien (1988, p. 11)      